History may be narrative, descriptive, interpretive, ana-
lytical,  or  significant.  It usually  exhibits  these  qualities  in 
combination. No single quality or combination of qualities is 
inherently preferable to the others. The nature of the histori-
cal object and,  even more,  the kind of question  asked  of it 
determine the type of history to be written. This book deals 
in interpretation, analysis, and significance, not only because 
these dimensions seem particularly appropriate to the history 
of  ideas,  but also  because  each  of  them  is  a  response  to  a 
reason  for  undertaking  the  work. 
A  historical  interpretation  tells  where  an  event  (in  its 
broadest  sense)  came  from.  Since  a  chief  purpose  of  this 
book is  the inquiry into the process  of intellectual diffusion 
through  the  examination  of  an  intermediate  stage  in  it,  I 
have tried to establish for  each category of thought the rele-
vant  ideas  and circumstances  available  to  the  disseminator 
and interpretive of his assumptions. 
A historical analysis tells what the event was  composed of. 
Since a second purpose of the book is to gain an internal view 
of natural-law political thinking through the examination of 
a secondary interpreter whose mental processes are the more 
penetrable for  their lack  of either flawless  logic  or leaps  of 
[vii] Preface 
genius,  I  have presumed to take apart a complex of ideas in 
order to determine in detail how they were fitted together. 
Historical  significance  tells  where  the  event  went  to  or 
toward.  I  have  inquired  along  this  line  on  two  different 
levels.  First,  I  have  asked  the  obvious  question  about  the 
converse  effects  of  the  ideas  studied  here  upon  the  more 
general  currents  in  which  they  were  spawned.  Second,  the 
subject  was  chosen  and  its  meaning  plumbed-as  the  title 
indicates-for its contribution to the solution of a  perennial 
problem, constant in Western history and relevant today.  In 
its broadest terms, this problem involves the tension inherent 
in man's simultaneous commitment to logical coherence and 
to  a  reality  that splinters  logical  coherence,  and  it involves 
further  the  adjustment  which  men  make  in  their  ideas  to 
resolve the tension. Because the problem is a continuing one 
through various times and circumstances, the meaning for it 
of  the  historical  events  here  under  consideration  connects 
history  with  fundamental  human  concerns  that  transcend 
history and by the same token connects the history that is  to 
be understood with the historian who tries  to  do the under-
standing. 
Seventeenth-century  Europe  is  not  a  favored  field  of 
American  study.  My  acknowledgments,  consequently,  are 
few,  but all  the  more  profoundly felt  for  that.  I  have  dedi-
cated  this  book  to  my  wife  because  she  understands  better 
than  anyone  I  know  the  inimitable  truths  that  only  the 
structure of a crystal can deliver about the world at large, and 
because she appreciates more than anyone  I  know the value 
of  writing about  them.  Hajo  Holborn,  ever  my  friend  and 
still  my  teacher,  first  indicated  the  figure  of  Pufendorf as  a 
provocative  historical  problem  and  then,  with  infinite  pa-
tience and wisdom, abetted my efforts to solve it. Carl Briden-
baugh,  Bernard  Bailyn,  and  Daniel  J.  Boorstin  graciously 
[viii] Preface 
entered into dialogues on the American dimension of Pufen-
dorf's influence,  establishing a  desirable communication be-
tween  the  traditional  divisions  of  history. 
To Yale University, the Center for Advanced Study in the 
Behavioral  Sciences,  the  Institute  for  Advanced  Study,  and 
the University of Chicago go my thanks for underwriting the 
release  from  academic  duties  which  facilitated  the  prepara-
tion  and  completion  of  this  work. 
A  note  on  the  use  of  sources: 
Pufendorf's  three  basic  works  on  political  theory-the 
Elementorum  jurisprudentiae  universalis,  the  De  jure  na-
turae  et genti-um,  and the De  officio  hominis et  civis-have 
all had competent English translations  (Oxford,  1931,  1934, 
1927,  respectively) .  For  the  convenience  of American  read-
ers, all references to these works are to these translations save 
in  those  particular  cases  where  the  translation  does  not 
convey  the  precise  political  connotation.  For  each  of  these 
cases  I  have  specified  the  Latin  edition  used.  Unless  so 
specified,  the  reference  is  to  the  English  translation.