Without "boots on the ground" that are tactically proficient enough to survive as tiny well-dispersed elements without any help from supporting arms, America should not plan to win any more wars. This book shows how the Pentagon could--with some "truly light" infantrymen and more self-sufficient commandos--project more overseas power at less cost in money and lives. Since Korea, America's foes haven't needed as much preparatory fire or technology, nor have they caused as much collateral damage. This makes them more appealing to local populations. "One More Bridge to Cross" takes a closer look at what happened at Belleau Wood, Guadalcanal, and later battles. Then, it shows how to defend against (and acquire) advanced surprise assault technique. Semi-autonomous U.S. squads will not be possible until control over training has been decentralized. Too little tactical experimentation at the company/school level has been the problem. Since the Vietnam War, it has become increasingly clear that America's defense establishment cannot defeat any "bottom-up-operating" (criminal-or-Asian-oriented) foe without first allowing more initiative from its own lowest echelons.