Description:... We present a framework that clarifies the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and the conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise. In the model, traditional conditionality commits country authorities to undertake crisis resolution efforts, facilitating the return of private capital, and ensuring repayment to the IMF. Nonetheless, moral hazard can arise if there are crisis externalities across countries (contagion) or if country authorities discount crisis costs too much relative to the national social optimum, or both. Moral hazard can be avoided by making IMF lending conditional on crisis prevention efforts-"ex ante" conditionality.
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* نتیجه بررسی از طریق ایمیل ارسال خواهد شد
شماره کارت : 6104337650971516 شماره حساب : 8228146163 شناسه شبا (انتقال پایا) : IR410120020000008228146163 بانک ملت به نام مهدی تاج دینی