Cultural sciences : their origin and development

Twelve years ago, I planned to write a relatively short introduction to the future of sociology, including a survey of the sociological problems awaiting solution and an anticipation of new problems. I realized soon, however, that we cannot foresee the future of a science without taking into consideration not only its present, but also its past. For every science is evolving gradually, and its achievements and problems at any time originate in past achievements and problems. I decided therefore to prepare an outline of the historical evolution of sociology. But this evolution proved to be inseparably connected with the whole development of philosophic and scientific knowledge, and historians have traced the origin of this development as far back as three thousand years ago. This explains why I begin my outline with the period preceding the growth of Greek theoretic thought, and survey briefly the persistence of certain old philosophic theories and the progress of new scientific theories. It does not explain, however, the main content of this work, as indicated by its title. Why the term "sciences" in the plural? It conflicts with the ideal of the unity of scientific knowledge, in which many scientists believe. Why the adjective "cukural"? It contradicts the current theory according to which, even if there sire several sciences, each of them (including sociology) is a "natural" science. Well, in my younger days when I was a philosopher, like most other philosophers, I believed in the future unification of all valid knowledge. I did not base this belief, however, on the prevalent doctrine that all valid knowledge will become united because it is scientific knowledge of nature, and the natural universe will prove to be united. I relied, instead, on the doctrine that all valid knowledge is knowledge of culture, since even human observations and theories of nature are cultural products; and it will be come united because the entire world of culture, when studied in historical perspective, will prove to be united. But, contrary to both doctrines, the development of scientific knowledge of nature as well as of culture has resulted in a growing functional differentiation and multiplication of sciences. I see no reason to regret this historical trend or to hope that it will be reversed. It continually broadens the scientific horizon and enriches the intellectual life of mankind. The main objection against it is the excessive specialization of individual scientists, who know nothing beyond their own fields of research. But this is a practical problem which can be solved by new education and new creative cooperation among specialists. Are we justified, however, in assuming, as the title of this book suggests, that there is a definite class of cultural sciences, different from those sciences which are popularly called natural, and that sociology belongs to this class? Here, again, we refer to historical evidence. The more objective, thorough, and methodical the scientific research in the world of culture, the more manifest the essential difference of this world from the natural universe. Many admirers of natural sciences, epistemologists, and metaphysicians do not like this result of scientific progress. But they cannot stop it. Like every author, I am aware that I have many personal obligations to others. As far as this book is concerned, it would have taken me nearly twice as much time without the collaboration of my wife, Eileen Markley Znaniecki, and some parts of it might be more difficult to understand. J. William Albig did everything possible to encourage and help me complete the work. Robert Bierstedt, who read the manuscript as it was being written, gave me stimulating appreciation, constructive criticism, and significant suggestions. But some of my obligations began long before this book was started. If William I. Thomas had not asked me to collaborate with him on The Polish Peasant, I would probably have remained all my life a philosopher, and never have turned to sociology as an inductive science. I owe to Robert M. Maclver and Theodore Abel an invitation from Dean (now President) William F. Russell of Teachers College which brought me to Columbia University for two years, from 1931 to 1933. Thanks again to Robert Maclver, I lectured at Columbia University in the summer and fall of 1939, and thus escaped a Nazi concentration camp and could join the University of Illinois faculty in 1940.